	N9F6FTCC	Final Pretrial	Conference
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW		
2			
3	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL,		
5	Plaintiffs	5,	
6	V.		17 CV 0124(LLS)
7	QUINCY BIOSCIENCE HOLDING et al.,	G CO.	
8	Defendants	S •	
9		x	
10			New York, N.Y. September 15, 2023 12:45 p.m.
12	Before:		1
13	HON.	LOUIS L. STANT	ON,
14			District Judge
15		APPEARANCES	J
16	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION		
17	Attorneys for Plaint BY: CHRISTINE DeLORME	ziff	
18	TIFFANY M. WOO EDWARD GLENNON ANDREW WONE		
19	ANDIEW WONE		
20	NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE AT	ciff	
20 21		ciff	
	Attorneys for Plaint BY: KATHRYN A. MATUSCHAM MARY F. ALESTRA KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP	ziff K	agiongo et al
21	Attorneys for Plaint BY: KATHRYN A. MATUSCHAM MARY F. ALESTRA KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP Attorneys for Defend BY: GEOFFREY W. CASTELLO	dant Quincy Bios	science, et al
21 22	Attorneys for Plaint BY: KATHRYN A. MATUSCHAM MARY F. ALESTRA KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP Attorneys for Defend	dant Quincy Bios	science, et al

N9F6FTCC Final Pretrial Conference APPEARANCES (Continued) COZEN O'CONNOR PC Attorneys for Defendant Underwood BY: MICHAEL B. de LEEUW TAMAR WISE

N9F6FTCC Final Pretrial Conference

THE COURT: Obviously, what this meeting needs is an agenda, and I'm not quite clear on what the agenda is, but it seems to me that it should follow the excellent letter that I got on September 13 laying out the situation in a well thought-out way. And if we answer the questions in that letter, understandably, there are many layers to this case. But if we accomplished that much, it seems to me we've done a good day's work.

As a background, the interplay, of course, between the law and the equities and the jury questions and nonjury questions don't clarify things much. But in a funny sense, they isolate them in useful ways. And it seems to me that in the overall, the picture is wrong, simple, if you approach it in linear time.

It's not going to be one trial and all of these questions presented at once. It's really a series of layers of trial, and these problems will come sequentially. And as we approach each one of them in real life — we're following the English method, which is you don't decide in advance a whole lot of things that you're not aware of in full at once. When you get to those, you will be just as smart as you are now, and you will be much better informed. And that's the way these questions will fall into order. And then taken like that, it's not going to be particularly difficult, so you should not be awed, but methodical.

Final Pretrial Conference

And it sounds oversimplified, but it seems to me that perhaps the controlling picture is this really starts with a separate trial of the state's case on its statute, 349 to 350, and that goes to the jury, and it's tried to the jury with consequences that later have their affects, but those should not be allowed to complicate the fact that it's that trial. And you have opening statements relative to that trial, and we proceed. The state thinks it's seven days, and the defendants 15 days. Well, it will take something in that area, and when we get to real life, it will take whatever it takes.

So these are very useful questions against that concept. And if it's deeply wrong, for heaven's sake, tell me now.

Okay. First question is a very sensible one of trial structure. I think it accurately describes exactly what I've just said was the proper way to view it. Underwood, of course, presents a somewhat specialized problem, but I don't think it should complicate the first trial. It is a fair question, should Underwood be allowed to address the jury with respect to the state claims, because they will later be binding as against him. And I'm open, very much open, to thoughtful arguments about that.

It sounds like a basic fairness. On the other hand, there is a good deal to be said to letting the jury focus on its own duty in its own case without worrying about the

Final Pretrial Conference

consequences that my follow in another setting.

I think I'm a little inclined towards that, but I'm open to argument. The good thing is we have plenty of time.

I find that what I'm doing is probably not what I should be doing, which is reading these and giving my own action. The more common and much better procedure is I should hear your desires and reactions first. So we will have that. It's a question I regard as, for one, easily postponed because it really doesn't arise until post-verdict. And post-verdict, we'll know a lot more about the actual case. But anybody who has questions or suggestions they want to make, that's why we're here.

MR. GLENNON: Your Honor, Edward Glennon with the Federal Trade Commission.

I want to ask you, you said the first section of the trial, phase of the trial would involve the state court claims, which we agree with that. To clarify, our position is that the Federal Trade Commission, we would argue that we would be able to participate in that phase of the trial.

THE COURT: You would do what?

MR. GLENNON: Would we be able to participate in that phase of the trial since the Court would be bound with regard to our claims by the jury's findings?

THE COURT: Yes. Does anybody think they should not be allowed to participate in the actual trial of the case, the

Final Pretrial Conference

1	examination of witnesses? That's what you're asking?
2	MR. GLENNON: Correct. Also in terms of opening
3	statement, closing argument as well.
4	THE COURT: That, I would regard as a separate
5	question. A lot of argument about something that they're not
6	going to be allowed to decide has some drawbacks. But I'd like
7	to hear, or I'd like to let you talk among yourselves about
8	what your preference is. What interests are involved in the
9	answer to that question?
10	MR. CASTELLO: Geoffrey Castello. I represent the
11	corporate defendants.
12	If we're talking in terms of the FTC addressing the
13	jury
14	THE COURT: You'll be defending the case against the
15	same fact, really, but under the name of the New York State
16	statute.
17	MR. CASTELLO: Correct. Right. I think the only
18	THE COURT: It seems to me you're going to be doing
19	exactly what you would want to be doing if you were trying one
20	or both or either of the two cases in any sequence.
21	MR. CASTELLO: I agree with that. The difference that
22	the parties have, the difference that the FTC and the
23	defendants have relates to opening and closing statements.
24	THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. de LEEUW: It's our position --

N9F6FTCC Final Pretrial Conference

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. CASTELLO: Our position is that under the FTC Act, under FTC law, the FTC does not have a right to a jury. That was invoked because of the claims raised by the NYAG. So I

THE COURT: And what is your position on that?

participate in a conduct of the trial in terms of examining

7 witnesses and presenting evidence or attempting to present

don't think we have a disagreement that the FTC would

evidence. The difference comes, I think, strictly in the realm

of opening and closing statements, which they can do outside of

the jury's hearing but still make those arguments to you.

THE COURT: But you don't want them to be able to, that's your position?

MR. CASTELLO: Yes, your Honor. That they should not be permitted to open or close in front of a jury.

THE COURT: And why do you think that is better?

MR. CASTELLO: I don't know if it's better or not.

It's a matter of whether or not the law would entitle the FTC to present opening and closing statements to the jury. That would be unprecedented. There are some differences in the two — or the various statutes, state and federal, at issue here. I don't want to suggest how that should be navigated by plaintiffs. But it is our position that because they are not entitled to present in front of a jury, if it were strictly a claim brought by the FTC only under the FTC Act, this would be a bench trial.

Final Pretrial Conference

THE COURT: Well, the person that would have to be directed to the interesting point in that situation, which is that their findings with respect to the state statute, the factual findings, are later going to be binding on me as they effect the nonjury points. So it's not a simple as it looks at first.

MR. CASTELLO: It never is, your Honor. I agree. I understand. But that is our position. And, your Honor, I should say, I represent the corporate defendants. Ms. Wise and Mr. De Leeuw represent Underwood individually. And I think Mr. De Leeuw might have something he might want to say, or I'm happy to entertain more questions.

MR. de LEEUW: I think you laid out our position very well. They can participate in the trial, cross-examine witnesses, examine witnesses, but they shouldn't be presenting in front of a jury. And the one thought is that it could confuse the jury to have the FTC addressing them as the FTC at the outset. It could also potentially prejudice the jury to think that both the federal government and the New York Attorney General are trying the case against the company. So we think there's reason the FTC should not participate in opening and closing arguments.

MS. MATUSCHAK: Your Honor, may I --

THE COURT: Is the better time for you to make your opening statements when we get to the FTC case and the nonjury

trial?

MR. GLENNON: Well, your Honor, the FTC's position is that I think it is a question of basic fairness, as you had referenced earlier, since the Court will be bound with regard to the FTC's claims. Then with regard to the jury findings for the FTC claims, we think we should have a right to argue to the jury. We think the Court could handle any issue of confusion by explaining our position to the jury, if necessary, if the Court thought it was necessary.

But basically, we think it is a matter of fairness since we will be bound — our claims will be determined by the jury's findings, then we should have a right to not only examine witnesses, but present opening statements and closing argument.

THE COURT: And present evidence?

MR. GLENNON: Correct.

MS. MATUSCHAK: Your Honor, I'm Kate Matuschak.

THE COURT: I had my doubts.

MS. MATUSCHAK: I'm with the New York

Attorney General, and I just wanted to say that we are in agreement with the FTC, that they should have a seat at the table because they are going to be bound by what the jury ends up with on the NYAG claims, and this has been an FTC and New York Attorney General case from the beginning.

THE COURT: Who are you representing?

Final Pretrial Conference

MS. MATUSCHAK: I'm with the New York Attorney General's Office.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MS. MATUSCHAK: Yes. And so our statutes are very similar. They have common facts. These facts are going to be presented to the jury first, and the Court is going to be bound by what the jury comes up with. So we think as a matter of fairness that the FTC should have a full seat at the table. When the facts are being presented to the fact-finder, that's going to end up binding both the AG and the FTC.

MR. GLENNON: And your Honor, if the Court is concerned, we could discuss with defendants or discuss with you an allotment of time so that if you were concerned about the plaintiffs having two bites of the apple, perhaps we can apportion time in some way so that that wouldn't be the case. So we would have the plaintiffs as a whole, two plaintiffs together, perhaps could have an equal amount of time to defendants in making those statements and arguments.

THE COURT: It seems to me that the time for the FTC case is after the AG's case. It's a question of how you regard it. If you regard it as foreclosed, because the jury's verdict will be binding, then that argues for some degree of presentation to the jury in the AG's case. On the other hand, a more healthy way of regarding it may be to say, look, it's a separate trial, and there's a different basis, and the time for

you to present your evidence, which would be different from something that would otherwise be the only evidence before the jury, and make your case then on its merits with the arguments and the evidence that pertains to that. And that's really the sound way to go, than to try to shoehorn a different purpose into the decision of the jury in the jury case.

Again, these are intriguing questions, and the thing to do is clarify, and my mind is now open — it is not closed, it's open — and there's some advantage in keeping it empty because these are things that ought to be considered carefully.

MR. GLENNON: If I could --

THE COURT: But my bias would be towards regarding them as two separate trials — one of which has some limitations imposed by the findings, factual findings by the jury in the first case.

MR. GLENNON: Your Honor, I would say I think the scenario is close — the first one you described. I think the jury's findings with regard to the state claims would be conclusive with regard to the FTC claims. So I don't think there would be a need to have a separate trial, a second trial with additional evidence. I think it would be exactly the same evidence, so I think it should be considered more as one trial. And the jury's findings with regard to the state claims would determine liability.

At least with regard to the corporate defendants in

the second stage, those findings would also be binding against the individual defendant, but the FTC would have to approve additional elements against the individual defendant. So those, we could address those issues separately and at a second hearing or second stage of the trial involving the individual defendant, but we do think that the overlap between claims against the corporate defendants, against the state, those would cover the FTC claims entirely. So it would be the same evidence for the state claims and the FTC claims.

So we don't think it's necessary to consider them two wholly different trials. It would be the same evidence, same argument. So that's why we think we would be bound, or the Court would be bound with regard to the FTC's claims by the jury's finding. We think the FTC should get a seat at the table and be able to argue, present opening statements and closing arguments.

THE COURT: What are you going to say to them that would make their judgment different from what it would be from them just listening to the state?

MR. GLENNON: Well, your Honor, we would talk to the state about how to divide up the issues. As Ms. Matuschak did say, the FTC has been involved. This has been an FTC case. We have done a lot of the work during the case, so we would want to combine our efforts to make the opening statements, to make our best arguments to the jury.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Final Pretrial Conference

THE COURT: And what's the answer to my question? MR. GLENNON: Well, of course the skill of the federal attorneys, of course, would be very helpful, without a doubt. That would be to supplement the skill of the New York attorneys, of course. THE COURT: So you would be saying the same things to them, except saying it better? MR. GLENNON: Well, we'd try not to say the same things. We are cognizant of the argument of unfairness about not having two bites of the apple, so we're happy to divide the issues in making any opening statements and/or closing arguments. But we would want a seat at the table, having prosecuted the case throughout. And since we will be bound, we do want to have a say. We want the jury to hear what we, the FTC, has to say and how we present the issues. THE COURT: What do the defendants think about that? MR. de LEEUW: Our view is the exact opposite. We represent Mr. Underwood, and the New York Attorney General does not have a claim against Mr. Underwood, only the FTC does. We're concerned if the FTC is in front of the jury discussing its full case, that is going to be a potential problem for us. We're going to be bound by also whatever happens in front of the jury, as your Honor will be.

THE COURT: You say discussed its full case?

MR. de LEEUW: So if it discusses it in any way.

THE COURT: So they say they'd like to add some things to the evidence that would be useful for them.

MR. de LEEUW: Well, we just think the dividing line is going to be difficult. We represent an individual, but he's also a principal at the company. It's going to be difficult. And a lot easier way to do it is to do what your Honor suggested, is essentially two trials, a separate trial for the FTC claims afterward.

I know that my friend has suggested that they can divide it up and leave all of the individual parts about Mr. Underwood until afterwards, but I just see that as being very difficult. And I think, again, we're willing to let the FTC participate in examining witnesses and cross-examining them. We don't think they should be addressing the jury in the opening and closing remarks. We think that's where the confusion can be created.

MR. GLENNON: If I could clarify our position, the FTC's position. We would not argue the issues involving only Underwood's individual liability to the jury. We would leave those to the second stage in the elements of our case, only against the individual defendant. We would leave those to a second hearing only before the Court.

So in making our opening statements and closing argument to the jury, we would not be addressing those elements that pertain only to Mr. Underwood. We would not want to

Final Pretrial Conference

confuse the jury in that way.

MR. CASTELLO: Your Honor, may I add something that I think is being lost here? These two agencies partnered together. They made a decision. They could have brought their actions separately. They partnered together. And when they did that, they had to understand that there are two bodies of law: One of which permits a jury trial, and one doesn't. And I think a practical problem could come at closing when the jury will hear charges relating to the NYAG's claims only; and yet, the FTC wants to close.

And this isn't a matter of fairness, as I see it.

This is a matter of law. The FTC does not have a right to a jury trial when it brings an action, an enforcement under the FTC Act. So the only reason why we're having this conversation — your Honor has to decide the issue — is because they decided to partner together.

Your Honor's initial reaction to how to conduct the trial is sound. They chose to bring these two separate actions together, then let's do a staged trial, and they still have not — the FTC still has an opportunity to participate when it comes to examining witnesses and presenting or attempting to present evidence.

THE COURT: I listened to these are very intelligent arguments. I have a growing fear that to the degree that the FTC improves its case by the contributions it makes in the AG's

Final Pretrial Conference

case, it is corrupting the simple trial of the AG's case. And it's entirely innocent, but that is the purpose of addressing them, opening, and closing. Whatever evidence is put in, it's put in to benefit the plaintiffs in the FTC case in a way that they would not otherwise have. And, by definition, I think that is a corruption of the separation that goes to the separation between the jury trial and the nonjury trial. So I'm concerned about whether that is the right path.

MR. GLENNON: I understand, your Honor. And I agree, this is a very unusual posture for the case. The FTC, typically — in cases which I have been involved, at least — has only its claims, so a jury is not involved. This is an unusual posture in that we, the FTC, would be affected by the jury's findings. So that is the reason for the difference in this case.

And, again, from our point of view, it does essentially come down to fairness since we will be bound and affected by the jury's finding. We feel we should have a seat and be able to participate fully.

MR. CASTELLO: Your Honor, I think that states well my view that this is a matter of law, not a matter of fairness.

MR. de LEEUW: And just representing Mr. Underwood, we would not expect to be allowed to participate in the opening and closing arguments in the New York Attorney General case because we're not a party to that case. And so our expectation

first phase of the trial.

is that we shouldn't be doing an opening or closing to the
jury. We can participate to the same extent the FTC can, but
we think it runs both ways. But we are not arguing that we
should be allowed to present in front of the jury opening or
closing arguments in a case to which we are not a party.
MR. GLENNON: Your Honor, the FTC would not object to
Mr. Underwood's participation or presentation of opening
statements or closing argument with the understanding that they
wouldn't address issues that the jury didn't have to decide.
But we would not oppose Mr. Underwood's participation of the
same extent as the FTC because he would be bound and affected
by the jury's findings as well.
THE COURT: I think for present purposes, we should
regard the two trials as completely separate, and the FTC is
not to participate in the nonjury trial.
MR. GLENNON: Would we be able to examine witnesses in
the jury trial, your Honor?
THE COURT: Would you consider that participating?
MR. GLENNON: I would, your Honor. Defendants don't
have a problem
THE COURT: Would anybody not consider it
participating?
MR. GLENNON: Yes. I note the defendants don't have

an objection to the FTC participating to that extent in the

N9F6FTCC Final Pretrial Conference

THE COURT: My present inclination is to think that you are really separate, and you will not be participating, even to the small extent of examining witnesses. Now, that might be subject to amendment. As we go along, there might be some fluke corner to the case where it's a perfectly fair thing to do. But I think the line we should be following is the complete separation. And the jury's verdict will be nothing but a proper jury's verdict on the germane evidence in that case, not as embellished by other considerations that would affect its judgment.

MR. GLENNON: Your Honor, just to fully state our position, I would note that in a proceeding before the second stage of a trial before the Court, there would not be any additional evidence with regard to many of the factual claims, like whether --

THE COURT: To many, you're saying?

MR. GLENNON: Correct. With regard to whether the advertisements were made or whether they were false or misleading, basically. The core issues with regard to the corporate defendants, certainly there would not be any additional evidence in the second stage of the trial. So all the evidence under those issues would come out before the jury, and we would be bound by the jury's findings. So I understand the Court's position, again, given that there would be no further evidence produced on those particular factual issues

Final Pretrial Conference

before the Court, the FTC would like to -- we believe we do have a place, at least in the examination of witnesses and presentation of evidence.

MS. MATUSCHAK: Your Honor, I'd like to add that the government agencies chose to collaborate in this case because our statutes are basically the same. There are some minor nuances, but the fundamental issue in this case is were the advertising claims made and were they substantiated. If they were not substantiated, then they were deceptive, and they therefore violate the FTC Act and the New York statutes at issue in this case.

So there wouldn't be any difference in the presentation by FTC lawyers versus the AG lawyers of our case to the jury. We're all looking to establish the same facts, and those same facts will meet the legal requirements of both statutes at issue. So it's not as if Mr. Glennon, standing in front of the jury, is going to present something different from what someone from the AG's office will present.

We've been working as a team of co-plaintiffs in this case. Given that we're government agencies doing law enforcement with limited resources, we decided to pull together to pursue what we perceive as a violator of both federal and state law. So as a matter of fairness, we think that the FTC should be with us at the table, and there won't be any difference, your Honor, in terms of presentation.

Ms. Azia is one of the attorneys from my office, and I don't think her presentation to the jury in terms of examining witnesses is going to be any different from what Mr. Glennon will do, because we're establishing the same set of facts.

Final Pretrial Conference

MR. GLENNON: And we have conducted discovery together. So the FTC has deposed certain witnesses, the New York Attorney General's Office has deposed certain witnesses. So we have handled discovery together. We've gone through that phase, working with the New York Attorney General's Office, and have developed the case with them.

And I agree with what Ms. Matuschak just said. There wouldn't be any difference in terms of interacting with the witnesses at trial. So, again, we wouldn't be doing a second examination of the same witnesses for two plaintiffs, it would just be one.

MR. CASTELLO: Your Honor, I see a big difference between two bodies of law that plaintiffs bring their actions under — that is that one allows a jury trial and one doesn't. That's the issue we're discussing now. Whether or not the claims relating to the merits of either one of their individual statutes are similar or not is not the point for purposes of this discussion.

The corporate defendants should not face a very important aspect of the trial — opening and especially closing

Final Pretrial Conference

statements — where an agency that does not have a right to a jury trial, because of their choice to partner together in this case, now will be addressing the jury. So, again, I don't think it's a matter of fairness in that sense. It's more a matter of the law that tells us whether or not a jury trial is permitted.

MR. de LEEUW: Also, they just argued that the presentations wouldn't be different. Whether that's true or not, they said that, and if that's true, doesn't that that auger toward keeping the trial separate? If it's not going to be different, then why risk the bleeding of one case over into another as well?

MR. GLENNON: Certainly, with regard to examination of witnesses and presentation of evidence, I don't think there's a danger, your Honor, of the FTC corrupting the process or inserting any additional argument at all improperly -- at all that would affect the jury.

THE COURT: Well, I think the law gives you a nonjury trial. And even if that's, to some extent or a great extent, limited by considerations of what happened in the jury trial, you still get the nonjury trial, and you can't sneak into the jury trial and affect it in a way that would lead to your advantage in a nonjury trial. They are separate. And I think the simplest way to try the jury trial is always the best, and the best way is to try it as the jury trial. And without

Final Pretrial Conference

bringing in nonjury matters, such as an opening, closing by people who are only entitled to a nonjury --

MR. GLENNON: What the --

THE COURT: -- that leads to a blurring. And the Court does its best to avoid blurring.

MR. GLENNON: Your Honor, I understand with regard to opening statements and closing argument. Again, would the FTC then be allowed to participate to the extent of examining witnesses that would not involve argument?

THE COURT: I was a lawyer for 30 years. I tried a lot of cases. And I always felt that when I was examining the witness, I was taking part in the case. If something has happened to change that — my time examining witnesses was a great deal of the case, and the rest was argument or opening statements, things like that. So I think the answer is, unfortunately, no.

MR. GLENNON: Could we have the opportunity to perhaps brief the issue, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, you may. And the only way that I would base it, as presently thinking, that I would be very interested in what you have to say is if it first made clear what the difference to the jury, having your presentation in the middle of the jury case, as compared to not having it. The risk is one of distortion, and the more the distortion benefits the person not entitled to a jury trial, the less just it is.

1	MS. MATUSCHAK: Your Honor
2	THE COURT: These are of course preliminary views, but
3	it's good to air them when we have time to think about them.
4	MS. MATUSCHAK: Thank you, your Honor. I just wanted
5	to seek a bit of clarification in terms of the risk of
6	distortion. I wonder if you can give us a little more guidance
7	as to when it's just a strict Q and A and presentation of
8	evidence, what the distortion risk is there based on who the
9	attorney is.
10	THE COURT: You're dragging a jury case into a
11	situation which it is not entitled to. That's the distortion,
12	to start with.
13	Should we be moving along?
14	MR. de LEEUW: Yes.
15	THE COURT: Mr. Underwood. What of the Underwood
16	participation should we address now?
17	MR. de LEEUW: Well, we think that your Honor is right
18	in your preliminary view on the FTC, and we think we would not
19	have the ability to participate in the trial when we're not a
20	party.
21	THE COURT: Yes.
22	MR. de LEEUW: So we agree with your Honor.
23	THE COURT: Yes, I think the consequence of the jury's
24	findings being binding, they are binding as far as they go and
25	as far as they express the evidence that's before them. They

Final Pretrial Conference

can't be expanded much beyond that. And it's an advantage of keeping separate things separate.

Oh, next question. Maybe I'm jumping ahead. If I am, it's simply out of a sense of what I should eat, thinking about lunch.

The calling and recalling of witnesses by the two sides, we do it all the time, and as much as is practical in every case. There's no problem with it. He is first called as a hostile witness, and then he testifies as a friendly witness, and then he has a reply. But the jury understands and everybody understands it's not a difficulty.

Trial lengths and trial days. My own lawyer here, who is very hard-driving, thinks that those are sort of languid dates. I think they're pretty reasonable, so I don't think you'll have a fight over that.

Motions in limine, I think the process is under control. Don't be surprised if all or a large portion are reserved until trial. It's in their nature. And the avoidance of -- well, let me put it the other order. The benefit of reserving that kind of question until trial is that then it's resolved in view of all of the proceedings that have happened up until that point and all of the things that have been said up until that point.

And any judge who has been on the bench as long as I have has had the rather discouraging experience of having, for

Final Pretrial Conference

sound intellectual reasons, excluded evidence in advance, and who finds in the middle of trial the whole bases for that determination is no longer a fact, and now the ends of justice require that you are to get that evidence back and have it heard. And that, of course, from some sense, is the advantage of the motion in limine. But it's a disadvantage also.

And the common experience is that the motion in limine, which is reserved until trial decided then, that presents a lot fewer problems than it does in the material submitted with the motion in limine. A lot of them go away, including some of the experts. But they certainly don't reoccur at trial. So there are powerful motors towards treating them that way. And it really takes an exceptional case that says that this one — they really ought to know is getting in or is not, or this would really be a waste of time, something like that.

MS. MATUSCHAK: Your Honor, could I just, on that one point, in terms of Daubert, there are a number of witnesses that the Court has just cited to reserve judgment on, and it could fundamentally change the length and content of the trial. And so the parties —

THE COURT: That's for the good, because that's when they should be heard.

MS. MATUSCHAK: Understood. Yes. The parties had inserted into a letter just a question for the Court --

Final Pretrial Conference

1	THE COURT: We're not trying to shorten the trial by
2	deciding the questions one by one first. It's not a good
3	procedure. The best procedure is trying it.
4	MR. GLENNON: Your Honor, with regard to the motions
5	in limine, we did want to see what procedure you'd like the
6	parties to follow in terms of filing those. Should we file a
7	letter requesting a pre-motion conference?
8	THE COURT: No, no. No pre-motion.
9	MR. GLENNON: Okay.
10	THE COURT: Just the barebones of the motion in
11	limine.
12	MR. GLENNON: Thank you, your Honor.
13	THE COURT: And the Daubert reasons. And like
14	anything else, the clearer the statements are, the more
15	effective they are.
16	Is there anything else that we should be doing today?
17	MR. de LEEUW: Trial date, a date for trial.
18	THE COURT: A date for trial seems to be shaping up
19	for January.
20	Mike, the latter half?
21	DEPUTY CLERK: I think you had thought about
22	February 6.
23	THE COURT: February 6. These things are still, to
24	some degree, in the hands of the committee that was forced on
25	us by COVID, but they are getting more and more back to the old

1	system where you can claim a date with a pretty fair chance of
2	getting it. I'd look at a date in that line.
3	MR. de LEEUW: Okay.
4	THE COURT: One of the Court's greatest specialists in
5	this field is Mike Lee.
6	MR. de LEEUW: Absolutely.
7	THE COURT: He knows all about it.
8	MR. GLENNON: Your Honor, a question about the second
9	stage involving Mr. Underwood, his individual liability.
10	THE COURT: Yes.
11	MR. GLENNON: Would the Court envision a hearing on
12	that to follow immediately after the jury proceedings?
13	THE COURT: Yes. No. We're going to know so much
14	more about this, what the issues are, at that point and how
15	much time we have and when we would like to schedule. But to
16	try to do it now is just fooling yourself. It will come along
17	in due course.
18	MR. GLENNON: Okay.
19	THE COURT: But basically if it were necessary to be
20	addressed to Mr. Underwood, it can be regarded as postponed
21	until after the trial because you will have a sure sense of
22	what it involves.
23	MR. GLENNON: I understand, your Honor. Thank you.
24	THE COURT: Thank you, all. Have a good weekend.

(Adjourned)

25